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REASSESSING THE MAGNETIC PULL OF
MEGACASES ON PROCEDURE
Richard L. Marcus*
INTRODUCTION
The procedural Big Bang that we believe followed the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 enabled proceduralists to
think of themselves as central to critical legal developments. Some-
times, others appear to begrudge us that centrality; Professor Coffee,
for example, has written that procedure is too important to be left to
proceduralists. 1
Since the Big Bang, or at least since World War II, it has regularly
been said that the main agent for procedural change in this country
has been complex litigation. Although no one can be sure how to
define complex litigation, many agree that it is the phenomenon that
has regularly preoccupied those who focus on procedure, including
the rule makers. Some decry this preoccupation, arguing that it leads
to unwarranted generalizations about all litigation and produces rem-
edies that may be desirable for big cases but not for most cases.2 An-
other ongoing theme involves synergy: big cases prompt procedural
changes, and, in turn, those procedural changes produce more big
cases.
* Horace 0. Coil ('57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. Since 1996 I have served as Special Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
and worked actively on the amendments to the discovery rules that went into effect on Dec. 1,
2000. Besides academic commentary, this article draws on comments made during the public
commentary process in regard to those amendments. Often the Committee was criticized for
designing rules that were prompted only by the needs of complex cases. I have not tried to
include citations to those comments. Copies of the comments, and the transcripts of the public
hearings on those amendments, are available at the Rules Committee Support Office of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. I am indebted to Vince Moyer of the Has-
tings Library for compiling background materials on tobacco litigation.
1. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1987) (asserting that, "Just as
war is too important to be left to the generals, civil procedure-with apologies to Clemenceau-
is too important to be left to proceduralists.")
2. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional
Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 166-68; 188-95
(1997) (stating that by the 1990s judges were applying to ordinary cases the procedures devel-
oped in the 1950s to deal with the problems of big cases, and that rule makers tended to devise
new procedures based on experiences with big cases but to apply them to all cases).
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Because tobacco litigation is widely touted as the biggest of all big
cases,3 it seems worthwhile to reflect on the notion that big cases have
been the driving force behind procedural change in this country for
the last half century. If tobacco litigation is the biggest of all big cases,
it should produce the most striking procedural developments. This
paper addresses the question whether tobacco litigation has actually
done so.
My review of tobacco litigation is that it has been a dud in terms of
procedural innovation. Perhaps we should reexamine the entire
theme of complex litigation as the sparkplug of modern procedural
developments. As Professor Leubsdorf has recently written, the
American belief that the adoption of the Federal Rules produced a
revolution may be a myth.4 The idea that megacases have paved the
way for further developments may also be a myth.
To evaluate these questions, I begin with a typology of complex liti-
gation, finding three general groupings of such cases during the post-
World War II era. I then connect those groupings to the main strands
of procedural innovation during that period, and use the former cham-
pion of megalitigation-asbestos litigation-to show how one set of
cases can produce myriad changes and attempted changes in
procedure.
Against that background, I contrast the relatively limited impact to-
bacco litigation has had on procedure and offer some explanations
why this seems to be the case. In conclusion, I suggest that the pre-
sumed connection between megalitigation and procedural innovation
may be epochal rather than eternal, and that we may have come to a
time when the main innovations will be substantive rather than proce-
dural. Assuming so, tobacco litigation might be a symptom of a new
reality, at least for mass torts, in which the scimitar of change shifts
away from the proceduralists. But there remain reasons to expect that
this change will not happen.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF MEGALITIGATION
This article uses the term "megalitigation" to describe a small cate-
gory of large-scale complex litigation. Defining complex litigation has
proven challenging, even for the editors of the Manual for Complex
3. See Howard Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the
Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2 (2000)
(asserting that "[t]he tobacco litigation is the most massive in a string of mass torts including
asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and breast implants").
4. John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL JUSTIICE IN CRISIS (A. Zuck-
erman, ed., 1999), at 53.
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Litigation, 5 so one must approach the task of offering a typology of
megalitigation diffidently. Nonetheless, courts have begun to recog-
nize this new subcategory of complex litigation. Confronting a huge
securities case, for example, Chief Judge Becker of the Third Circuit
remarked that it "presages a new generation of 'mega-cases' that will
test our previously-developed jurisprudence."'6 There seem to be
three main categories of such litigation during the last fifty years, and
these appear to have assumed prominence during different parts of
that period. For one anxious to relate these phenomena with proce-
dural change, a typology is a good place to start.
A. Large-Scale Commercial Litigation
The first major category consists of commercial cases. Of course,
not all commercial cases are included; only those of the largest dimen-
sions could qualify as megalitigation. Before 1950, those sorts of
cases, particularly antitrust cases, had already emerged as distinctive.
Thus, in 1949, the Judicial Conference appointed a committee headed
by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to study the problem of "protracted
litigation."'7 This sort of litigation was not, obviously, entirely un-
5. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (1969). The original Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion, published in 1969, defined complex litigation as "cases which present unusual problems and
which require extraordinary treatment," and also described types of "potentially complex cases,"
focusing on either the type of claim made (e.g., antitrust, patent, or mass disaster) or the proce-
dural characteristics of the case (e.g., multiparty cases, class actions, or derivative actions). See
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ 0.10; 0.22 (1969). The second edition, published in 1985,
did not even attempt such a definition. The third edition, published in 1995, acknowledged the
prior version's ambivalence on the subject of definition, and offered a "functional definition of
complex litigation" that looked to the need for judicial management of the case. MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION 3 (3d ed. 1995).
Others have continued to try to come up with catalogues to identify these cases. The Califor-
nia Rules of Court, for example, recently adopted a special scheme for "complex cases" with
provisional designation as complex for the following: antitrust or trade regulation claims, con-
struction defect claims, securities claims, environmental or toxic tort claims, mass torts, class
actions, or insurance coverage claim arising of any of the foregoing. See Cal. Rules of Court
1800(c).
Academics try to come up with definitions as well. For an example, see Jay Tidmarsh, Unat-
tainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1673 (1992) (arguing that complex cases involve at least one of four "modes of
complexity" with the "unifying attribute" that the case can be resolved only "through the accre-
tion to the federal judiciary of powers traditionally assumed by other 'actors' (parties, lawyers,
jurors and state courts)").
6. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 218 (3d Cir., 2001).
7. Hon. E. Barrett Prettyman, The Report on Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted
Cases, in Hon. Leon R. Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41 (1951) (hereinafter
"The Prettyman Report"). The report explained that it focused on cases involving "many issues,
many defendants, hundreds of exhibits .... [and] ... weeks or months of hearings ... [with] ...
thousands of pages of testimony." These cases, "while not numerous, are of sufficient frequency
to create an acute major problem in the current administration of justice." Id. at 63-64. It added
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known before 1938. Some of the most notable litigation of the Pro-
gressive era, for example, consisted of antitrust suits brought by the
government. Some of them produced decrees that remained in effect
at mid-century.8 The recent governmental action against Microsoft
shows that this sort of case is not dead. 9
Yet by 1950, the private antitrust action was emerging as important
in its own right, and securities fraud litigation began to emerge as an-
other category of private suit that deserved attention. It is worth not-
ing that it was not until 1947 that a federal court first recognized a
private right to sue for violation of Rule 10b-5.10 During the 1950s,
there were a number of sessions organized by the federal judiciary to
study the problems of this sort of suit."
Until the 1970s, large-scale commercial litigation ordinarily in-
volved claims by individual plaintiffs or the government against corpo-
rate defendants and those associated with them. As Bryant Garth
noted, however, a new species of commercial megacase became prom-
inent during the 1970s and 1980s, when businesses that formerly es-
chewed litigation against one another came to view it as a legitimate,
and sometimes attractive, strategic maneuver.' 2 This development led
Garth to report in 1993 that the most important recent development
was the emergence of "mega-litigation," with a theme of escalating
conflict in such cases. This is not to say that the individual plaintiff
suit became insignificant during this period, but it was joined with an
important subcategory of commercial litigation between large com-
mercial entities.
that "[miany of the suggestions and comments which it contains are inappropriate in ordinary
actions." Id. at 64.
8. Perhaps the classic illustration is the consent decree entered against the meatpackers to
ward off a threatened antitrust action by the government in 1920. The decree precluded defend-
ants from vertical integration in the meatpacking industry, a prohibition that seemed to some to
be less important as the decades passed and large retail distributors of food products developed.
Nonetheless, the decree endured into the 1970s. For a description of this history, see DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1029-35 (1985).
9. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming in part and
reversing in part after the District Court found antitrust violation and ordered company to be
split in two).
10. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (recognizing private
right of action for violation of federal securities fraud statutes).
11. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1957) (describing
sessions at N.Y.U. Law School); Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319
(1958) (describing sessions at Stanford Law School).
12. Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Pro-
fession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 932, 941-42) (1993) (describing "mega-litigation" in-
volving large corporations).
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B. Public Law Litigation
If postwar America has a legal icon, it is Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.13 Brown I crystallized a version of equality that remains central
to the United States. But for those focused on trends in litigation, the
more significant aspect of the case emerged in Brown H,'4 in which
the Supreme Court began to grapple with judicial implementation of
the constitutional principles like those articulated in Brown I.
To an important extent, the Warren Court ushered in an era of con-
stitutional challenges to governmental activity. School systems could
be and were sued for segregation. Prisons could be and were sued for
having inhumane conditions. Meanwhile, legislation expanded the
opportunity for broad scale challenges to the operation of public and
private entities. Although the civil rights acts of the Reconstruction
Era had been on the books for three quarters of a century, it was not
until 1968 that their full potential began to be realized.' 5 And during
the 1960s and 1970s, an array of new legislation permitted private and
governmental actions in court to enforce statutory guarantees. 16 Em-
ployment discrimination, civil rights, and gender equity - these topics
were added to the list of statutory claims that could be brought to
court. Professor Chayes identified what followed as an outburst of
"public law litigation" in his seminal 1976 article.' 7 Chayes asserted
that "the dominating characteristic of modern federal litigation is that
lawsuits do not arise out of disputes between private parties about
private rights. Instead, the object of litigation is the vindication of
constitutional or statutory policies.' 18
As suggested by the challenges of Brown II, this new form of megal-
itigation did not readily fit the conventional mold for litigation. Iden-
tifying the proper parties was often difficult. Fashioning an
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding de jure segregation in public schools unconstitutional).
14. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (addressing the problem of remedy).
15. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (recognizing right to sue under 42
U.S.C. § 1982 for private racial discrimination). Not all were glad to see this happen. Consider
the following lament from a federal judge in 1971:
The etiology of judicial distress can be stated briefly: we have poured more into courts
than they can digest. The legal profession and the general public have long accepted
the premise that any controversy that can be cast in the form of a lawsuit should have a
ticket of admission to the courts.
Shirley M. Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 So. CAL.
L. REV. 901, 906 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Francis Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 497, 501-02
(1979) (describing the explosive growth of filings under some new legislation).
17. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976) (describing emergence of "new model of civil litigation").
18. Id. at 1284.
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appropriate decree often proved highly problematic because the
broad generalizations of constitutional or statutory guarantees did not
provide judges much guidance about how to remedy a violation.19
Judges were called upon to devise highly particularized directives that
depended upon great familiarity with the institutions they were trying
to change. And some remedies, such as busing to undo the effects of
discriminatory pupil assignment, could produce political and jurisdic-
tional problems. Moreover, the remedies had to remain in place for
long periods of time, and troubling questions about when the court-
imposed regime should be removed lay waiting in the future.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Professor Chayes con-
cluded that a "new model of civil litigation" had emerged from these
cases. As Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell pointed out, the features
Professor Chayes identified with the new form of litigation could be
found in old litigation as well.20 For example, as noted above, anti-
trust cases from the early part of the century often required judges to
calibrate a decree to achieve a general objective of restoring and pre-
serving competition through decades of operation. Yet, at least the
frequency and sometimes the public prominence of the new form of
litigation make it an important category for our consideration.
Recently, the importance of this category seems to have receded.
In part, this development may have occurred because, as Professor
Chayes observed in 1982, "the long summer of social reform that oc-
cupied the middle third of the century was drawing to a close. '21 But
cases of this sort are still being filed.2 2 And the definition of "public
law" is not as easy as Professor Chayes seemed to think. For example,
litigation designed to use common law tort doctrines to counter public
health risks could easily be likened to litigation designed to serve
other public interests, particularly if the court could be persuaded to
look beyond traditional damages remedies in fashioning judicial re-
lief.23 This leads to the third general category of megalitigation.
19. See Richard Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM 647, 680 (1988) (describing the difficulty courts confronted in developing specific remedies
to general constitutional violations.)
20. Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institu-
tional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980) (arguing that "new" model litigation was actually
not too different from its older forbearers).
21. Abram Chayes, Foreword, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV.
4, 7 (1982).
22. See, e.g., NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 187 F.R.D. 690 (M.D. Ga. 1999) (class
action alleging racial discrimination against school district).
23. See supra Marcus, note 19, at 671-74 (comparing personal injury litigation with "public
law" litigation).
[Vol. 51:457
REASSESSING THE MAGNETIC PULL
C. Mass Tort Litigation
Tort litigation is hardly a new phenomenon. Mass tort litigation,
however, seems to have leaped into American courtrooms in the
1980s. It was not unknown before that. The single accident mass tort
concept had been with us at least since Professor Estep urged in 1960
that the legal system be adapted to deal with the potential challenges
of claims based on nuclear accidents.24 The MER/29 litigation of the
1960s was a forebearer of contemporary mass tort litigation.25
It was not until the 1980s, however, that mass torts began to receive
broad attention. In 1981, Judge Spencer Williams sounded a warning
about this sort of litigation to explain his insistence on using a class
action in Dalkon Shield cases:
The latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed a virtual
explosion in the frequency and number of lawsuits filed to redress
injuries caused by a single product manufactured for use on a na-
tional level. Indeed, certain products have achieved such national
notoriety due to their tremendous impact on the consuming public,
that the mere mention of their names-Agent Orange, Asbestos,
DES, MER/29, Dalkon Shield-conjures images of massive litiga-
tion, corporate stonewalling, and infrequent yet prevalent, "big
money" punitive damage awards 26
The Johns Manville Chapter 11 filing in 1982 confirmed the growing
importance of mass tort litigation by showing that a seemingly vital
company could be felled by multiple tort suits. 27
During the 1980s and 1990s, mass torts were the most prominent
sort of megalitigation. Reflecting his broad experience with this de-
velopment, Professor McGovern has helped us to distinguish between
"immature" and "mature" mass tort litigation.28 But there is still
some uncertainty about what exactly qualifies as "true" mass tort liti-
gation. Thus, the Working Group on Mass Torts, appointed by Chief
Justice Rehnquist to study the resulting problems, warned that there
24. Samuel D. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury
Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1960) (analyzing problems of causation and damage measure-
ment, and suggesting consideration of a "contingent injury fund" to cope with these difficulties).
25. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Liti-
gation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968) (describing evolution and management of this litigation).
26. In re N. Dist. of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 526 F.
Supp. 887, 892 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, A.H. Robins
Co., Inc. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
27. See infra note 139 for discussion of this point.
28. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659, 659 (1989) (describing "mature mass tort litigation" in which "there has been full and com-
plete discovery, multiple jury verdicts, and a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs' contentions").
2001]
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was a risk courts might "create" mass torts by assuming that ordinary
recurrent litigation really constitutes a mass tort.2 9
III. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MEGALITIGATION AND
PROCEDURAL CHANGE
The above typology uses definitions that have fuzzy perimeters.
The dividing line between megalitigation and other complex litigation
is hard to articulate. When ordinary tort litigation mutates into mass
tort litigation is debatable. Public law litigation may be difficult to
distinguish from mass tort litigation, and most commercial suits surely
are not megacases. So there is reason to doubt that a vaguely defined
category of cases has precipitated procedural change.
But it is clear that those who promote procedural change say that
they are concerned with megacases and use them as reasons for mak-
ing the changes. In the 1940s and 1950s, for instance, the focus was on
"protracted cases," a small minority of all cases, and it resulted in the
1960 publication of the Handbook of Recommended Procedures for
the Trial of Protracted Cases, 30 the forerunner of the Manual on Com-
plex Litigation.
Perhaps in reaction, those who question procedural changes often
criticize them on the ground that they are stimulated by and designed
for the problems of a small subset of cases. Thus, Professor Galanter
objected to generalizations about problems in civil litigation made by
those who are "attuned to the 'top' of the system ... that small seg-
ment of law practice that deals in large cases, and thus to the concerns
of large clients."'31 And Professor Resnik repeatedly has criticized the
rule makers for taking rules designed for complex, large-scale cases
and making them applicable to all litigation.3 2 As Professor Rosen-
berg put it, "Cadillac style procedures are not needed to process bicy-
cle-size lawsuits, yet that is what the rules often appear to require. ' 33
Although one can question these generalizations, a brief survey of
the principal areas of procedural innovation during the last fifty years
29. See REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION 14-21 (1999) (describing the problem of "elastic-
ity" - the way in which aggregation of tort cases itself operates as a force that prompts filing of
more cases).
30. 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
31. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 4, 46 (1983).
32. See Resnik, supra note 2.
33. Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Halfa Century, 36 ME. L. REv. 243, 247
(1984).
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suggests that they do in fact correspond even if they do not only re-
spond to the demands of these sorts of cases.
A. Joinder and Class Actions
The first major task that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
undertook upon being reconstituted in the late 1950s was to revise the
formalistic joinder provisions adopted in 1938.34
At least in some ways, this effort consciously sought to equip the
federal courts with the tools necessary to deal with one species of
complex litigation, public law structural suits. Facilitating civil rights
suits was a primary objective of the framers of Rule 23(b)(2), 35 and
that, in turn, provided a framework for the structural litigation cases
Professor Chayes described a decade after the amendment went into
effect. Appropriately, his famous article was published in the issue of
the Harvard Law Review that contained its Developments in the Law:
Class Actions.36 Surely, the connection was not lost on the Review's
editors.
But the framers of revised Rule 23 hoped to avoid enabling another
species of megalitigation, the mass tort suit. Their Committee Note
explicitly disapproved of using class actions in mass accident cases. 37
So in that respect, the amendment to Rule 23 was hardly prompted by
megalitigation, and the framers worried about creating certain types
of megalitigation. With the passage of time, however, their admoni-
tion receded from view, and the apparent needs of mass tort litigation
prompted mass tort class actions, as depicted in the discussion of as-
bestos litigation below. 38 Once enacted, procedural rules can facilitate
results their creators hope to avoid.
34. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356 (1967) (describing new multiparty
joinder rules). Before this, the newly reconstituted Civil Rules Committee had finished work on
amendments first proposed by its predecessor, which was discharged in 1956. See Benjamin
Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1964)
(describing completion of earlier work).
35. See 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1775 at 470
(1986) ("subdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in 1966 primarily to facilitate the bringing of
class actions in the civil rights area").
36. Developments in the Law of Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318 (1976).
37. See Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 103 (1966) (A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is
ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions,
not only of damages but also of liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different
ways.").
38. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997), the Court recognized that events had passed the Advisory Committee Note by:
20011
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The other joinder rules have received less attention, but they also
play an important role in connection with megalitigation. Interven-
tion, in particular, has flowered in certain forms of public law litiga-
tion to enable diverse interests to be heard in such cases as
environmental suits. This development has occurred in synch with the
evolution of standing requirements, and there remains a question
whether interveners must demonstrate standing in addition to satisfy-
ing the intervention requirements of Rule 24. 39
Necessary party provisions also play an important role in such cases.
In employment discrimination litigation, for instance, Martin v.
Wilks 40 directed that nonminority employees must be joined under
Rule 19 if the action seeks certain types of affirmative action relief
that would trespass on their employment or promotion expectations.
The demands of Rule 19 in public law litigation spawned further
procedural reform, albeit from Congress. Accordingly, the 1991 Civil
Rights Act sought to obliterate the rule of Martin v. Wilks.41 This
provision of the Act could close the door on challenging many extant
decrees,4 2 but its solution may also strengthen the argument in future
cases. 43 In the same Act, Congress authorized damages recoveries for
Title VII claimants, thereby possibly subverting efforts to gather these
The Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23, it is true, noted that "mass
accident" cases are likely to present "significant questions, not only of damages but of
liability and defenses of liability .. affecting the individuals in different ways." And
the Committee advised that such cases are "ordinarily not appropriate" for class treat-
ment. But the text of the Rule does not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class
certification, and district courts, since the late 1970's, have been certifying such cases in
increasing number.
Id. at 625 (quoting Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 697). In the wake of this burial, it
would seem that the Note, by itself, no longer constitutes a significant obstacle to class certi-
fication.
39. Compare Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that interveners need not
possess standing) with Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding that party that seeks to intervene as of right must demonstrate standing).
40. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(A)(1) (1991) (limiting challenges to judgments resolving claims
of employment discrimination).
42. The Act does not do even that if, as has been held, it does not apply to decrees entered
before the statute was adopted. See Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding that Act should not be applied retroactively); cf. E.E.O.C. v. United Ass'n of
Journeymen, 235 F.3d 244, 254 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000) (agreeing that the Act should not be applied
retroactively).
43. If the legislation means that a nonparty who previously would have been able to escape
the binding effect of the decree in separate litigation is now unable to do so, that would seem to
make that party a person who should be joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19(a)(2)(i).
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claims in "hybrid" Rule 23(b)(2) class actions for monetary and in-
junctive relief.44
Another area of megalitigation, securities class actions, also
prompted procedural legislation by Congress in 1995 and 1998. The
earlier bill sought to change class action practices to require that the
class representative have a substantial stake in the litigation, as well as
introducing some other procedural obstacles to prosecution of these
cases.45 The later bill sought to prevent plaintiffs' lawyers from avoid-
ing the new federal court requirements by filing their cases in state
court.
4 6
Thus, the experience under the joinder rules has been that procedu-
ral innovation can "enable" some kinds of megalitigation, and that
developments in megalitigation prompt further procedural "reform."
Whether that reform accomplishes its objective is less clear. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, for example, probably was not designed to hamper
the filing of hybrid employment discrimination class actions, but it
may have that effect.
B. Multidistrict Transfer and Consolidation
The enactment of the multidistrict transfer statute was certainly not
as momentous as the revision of the joinder rules, but it is a prime
example of the causal relationship between megalitigation and proce-
dural change. It also illustrates how procedural changes can facilitate
megalitigation.
The immediate stimulus for the multidistrict transfer statute was the
outburst of commercial litigation in the wake of prosecutions for
price-fixing in the electrical equipment industry. Confronted with
about two thousand separate private antitrust actions in thirty-five dif-
ferent federal district courts, the judiciary initially reacted with infor-
mal innovation. Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed a Coordinating
Committee for Multiple Litigation composed of nine federal judges to
avoid the chaos that might otherwise have enveloped the federal
44. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that an em-
ployment discrimination class action was not predominantly for equitable relief because it
sought damages as allowed under the 1991 Civil Rights Act). For discussion, see Note, Evading
Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certification After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1847 (2000).
45. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.) (imposing new pleading and lead counsel require-
ments in securities fraud class actions).
46. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codi-
fied in various sections of 15 U.S.C.) (requiring, among other things, that most securities fraud
class actions be brought in federal court).
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courts had the depositions of key witnesses been scheduled in hun-
dreds of cases. The litigation went forward smoothly under the super-
vision of the ad hoc committee, which occupied itself with avoiding
duplicative discovery. Whether this sort of formality was really re-
quired is debatable. During roughly the same period of time, similar
efficiencies were effected in the MER/29 litigation by informal ar-
rangements created among counsel without organized judicial over-
sight.47 Nonetheless, the success of this activity in the electrical
equipment cases prompted Congress to institutionalize the experi-
ment by creating the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in
1968.48
Whether or not Congress so intended, the Act contained the seeds
for more aggressive use of the procedure because the Panel was au-
thorized to transfer cases for all "pretrial purposes." Some in Con-
gress were concerned about the potential impact of this new
procedure and sought to limit the authority of transferee judges to
managing discovery. 49 But the scope of discovery may depend on res-
olution of other matters such as motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment, and the statutory grant was not limited to discovery.
Multidistrict transfer enabled courts to accomplish for separate
cases something like what the 1966 revision of the joinder rules made
possible within a single case. Although the statute directed that the
cases be returned once the pretrial phase was completed, transferee
judges were quick to seize the opportunity to take an active role in
resolving litigation without returning the cases. Relying on their
broad pretrial authority, they often used 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to trans-
fer these cases to themselves for all purposes, including trial. Within a
decade, it was clear that the vast majority of cases never returned after
multidistrict transfer.50
This transfer power could also be used to achieve goals beyond liti-
gation efficiency by concentrating cases in a single forum and thereby
empowering a single judge to choose a coordinated outcome for the
merits of the consolidated cases. For example, when limited supplies
prevented Westinghouse Electronic Corporation from meeting its
contractual commitments to deliver uranium in the mid-1970s, it at-
47. See generally Rheingold, supra note 25.
48. Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (2001).
49. See Roger Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
779, 804-09 (1985) (criticizing broad use of transfer authority to decide non-discovery matters).
50. See Stanley Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and
Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 581, 583, (1978) (reporting that § 1404(a) transfer was "an
accepted procedure" and that only about 5% of cases transferred by the Panel were remanded).
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tempted to use interpleader to force all the claimants into a single
court. It was unsuccessful. 51 When the claimants sued separately,
however, Westinghouse was able to obtain a transfer order from the
Panel, which hoped thereby to "eliminate the possibility of colliding
pretrial rulings by courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and avoid poten-
tially conflicting preliminary injunctive demands on Westinghouse
with respect to its delivery of uranium. '52
Multidistrict transfer similarly magnified the importance of a re-
lated procedural technique-consolidation under Rule 42, which can
create proceedings resembling class actions.53 This potential presuma-
bly always existed, but it was fully realized only with the advent of
mass tort litigation. As a technique, it became the centerpiece of the
recommendations of the American Law Institute's Complex Litiga-
tion Project, 54 and is, therefore, another instance in which megalitiga-
tion prompted procedural innovation. At the same time, the capacity
of courts to confect gargantuan proceedings by consolidation tends to
create megalitigation as well. 55
What started as a -response to the demands of commercial megaliti-
gation thus became, to some extent, a technique for the creation and
concentration of mass tort megalitigation. In mass tort cases, mul-
tidistrict transfer holds the potential for creating megalitigation. The
Supreme Court's 1998 ruling that a transferee judge could not use
§ 1404(a) to transfer cases to herself for purposes of trial somewhat
curtailed the potential of the device.5 6 But this decision may be over-
turned by Congress, 57 and, in any event, there are ways to sidestep
it.58
51. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316, 317
(J.P.M.L. 1975) (describing interpleader action).
52. Id. at 319.
53. See generally Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LIT.
495 (1991).
54. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS
AND ANALYSIS (1994) (proposing use of expanded transfer powers to deal with problems caused
by dispersed litigation). For discussion, see Richard Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Co-
nundrum, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 879.
55. See Marcus, supra note 54, at 882-87 (describing consolidation as a "sleeping giant").
56. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
57. Legislation has been introduced in Congress to authorize transfer for trial. See H.R. 860,
107th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2.
58. See, e.g., In re Carbon Dioxide Indus. Antitrust Litig., 229 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that plaintiffs' stipulation to proceed to trial in the transferee court sufficed to permit it
to hold a trial).
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C. Discovery
Discovery is another area in which procedural changes may prompt
megalitigation and megalitigation appears to spark procedural change.
As Professor Subrin has shown, the Big Bang of 1938 did produce a
genuine revolution by introducing routine broad discovery.5 9 Broad
discovery, in turn, can contribute to megalitigation in part by unearth-
ing evidence that supports claims by many. Although the direct con-
tribution of broad discovery to success in certain types of claims is
debatable, it certainly played some role by supporting these claims. In
commercial litigation, for example, discovery may be a lifeline for
plaintiffs who could not have a hope of making out a case without it.
Mass tort litigation battles over discovery also evidence the impor-
tance of the procedure. Were it not for a real concern that broad dis-
covery could yield harmful evidence, it is unlikely that defendants
would resist as energetically as they do. Defendants' insistence that
discovery be held under wraps, even in relation to other litigation on
the same subject, supports this suspicion.
Another way in which broad discovery can contribute to megalitiga-
tion is by raising the financial cost of litigating. Repeatedly, those
who object that discovery is out of control cite the problem of "one-
way discovery," which results from the reality that in many cases one
side (usually the defense) has an enormous amount of information
while the other (usually the plaintiff) has little. In those circum-
stances, the parties may often have very different incentives about
broad discovery requests. Defense interests assert that plaintiffs will
use discovery as a club to impose costs on defendants. Plaintiffs, in
turn, assert that defendants use "dump truck" discovery responses as
methods of overwhelming their adversaries. In litigation between
businesses, meanwhile, there may be incentives to cooperate to avoid
undue discovery expense. But the recent expansion of aggressive liti-
gation between businesses suggests that this sort of self-restraint may
not be universal in such cases; reasonable behavior may merely be one
among many strategic options.
For a quarter century, these concerns have prompted calls for dis-
covery reform. From the outset, those calls have focused on large-
scale litigation, and they have been academically criticized as skewed
by emphasis on big-case litigation. Most recently, the Federal Judicial
Center's 1997 survey of recently closed federal cases showed that in
59. See Stephen Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REv. 691 (1998) (describing revolutionary break with the
past wrought by the adoption of the federal discovery rules).
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most cases, discovery worked relatively smoothly, but in a small pro-
portion of highly contentious cases, often those with high stakes, dis-
covery generated significant problems. 60
Responding in a gradual way to these calls for change, the rule mak-
ers have adopted a variety of techniques to ameliorate the reported
difficulties with discovery, mainly in large cases. The re-definition of
the scope of discovery, finally made in 2000,61 was originally proposed
in the 1970s largely as a way of responding to the demands of large
document litigation. 62 Numerical limitations on various discovery
events63 and the requirement that the parties develop a discovery plan
before embarking on formal discovery64 also seems most pertinent in
complicated litigation.
But other changes appear to point in a different direction, despite
the anguished objections of those involved with megalitigation. The
most striking example of that sort of anguish is the opposition occa-
sioned by the 1991 proposal to introduce initial disclosure, 65 a require-
ment that could be straightforward in simple cases but onerous in
high-stakes litigation, particularly if the complaint does not identify
the claim with precision. The version of disclosure ultimately adopted
in 1993 tried to overcome that concern with a particularity require-
ment, 66 and the returns from those who used disclosure were generally
quite favorable. But when a more modest form of disclosure was
made nationally obligatory in 2000, there was again objection that
"complex" cases should be exempted as a category. Perhaps ironi-
60. See Thomas E. Willging, et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice
Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998). The study found that
discovery problems differ depending on the nature of the case, and noted that, "where a lot of
money is at stake, where the relationships are contentious or the issues are complex, there is
more discovery and there are more problems." Id. at 555. It cautioned, however, that this might
not mean the problems are "more likely to occur as a consequence of case complexity," but
rather simply that there are more problems in some cases because there is more discovery in
those cases. Id.
61. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing discovery of matter relevant to the claim or defense
of any party, but reserving discovery of material relevant only to the "subject matter" involved
in the suit to judicial control).
62. See generally, Richard Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 756-60
(1998) (describing the 1978 proposal to narrow the scope of discovery).
63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A) (limiting number of depositions to ten); FED. R. Civ. P.
33(a) (limiting number of interrogatories to twenty-five).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
65. See Richard Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59
Brooklyn L. Rev. 761, 805-12 (1993) (recounting the controversy).
66. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 431 (1993) (1993
version of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) and (B)).
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cally, however, only very simple cases were categorically exempted. 67
Somewhat similar objections-that this would not suffice for complex
cases-emerged to the proposal adopted in 2000 to limit depositions
to "one day of seven hours. '68
D. Judicial Management
From many perspectives, the most pervasive change in judicial pro-
cedure during the last fifty years has been the rise of case manage-
ment. There is some evidence that mid-century judges took almost no
interest in civil cases pending before them until trial was imminent, or
at least until a motion was filed. Now, federal judges behave very
differently. American case management has not only swept this coun-
try, but also has become a beacon of hope to judicial reformers in
England. 69
A major stimulus behind this change was large-scale litigation. The
Prettyman Committee began the shift in judicial attitude by focusing
on the particular problems of "protracted litigation. '70 As Professor
Chayes argued in 1976, the peculiar demands of public law litigation
thrust the judge into the central role in that sort of case, and he there-
fore focused his analysis on the role of the judge.7' In 1985, I con-
cluded that "it is obvious that complex litigation was the nose by
which the camel of judicial control got into the litigation tent, and that
complex litigation is providing a model for the handling of all
litigation. '72
This may give megalitigation more credit than it deserves. The cur-
rent orientation is toward outwardly similar judicial intrusion into law-
yer control of litigation across a wide spectrum. And some
explanations for this judicial behavior have no particular application
to large cases. To the contrary, the argument is that litigation gener-
ally has become too costly and takes too long.73 In passing the Civil
Justice Reform Act, Congress took that view. Thus, it endorsed judi-
67. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(E) (enumerating categories of proceedings exempted from
initial disclosure).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).
69. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Final Report of the Lord Chancellor) (1996) (recommending
development of case management for English courts). For discussion of this effort, see A.A.S.
ZUCKERMAN & Ross CRANSTON, REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1995).
70. See Prettyman Report, supra note 7, at 8.
71. See Chayes, supra note 17.
72. RICHARD MARCUS & EDWARD SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 13 (1985).
73. See Robert Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management,
Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253
(1985) (justifying active judicial management of most litigation).
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cial management as a cure for small or moderate-sized cases, but not
for megalitigation. 74
Other features support the conclusion that, whatever case manage-
ment may become for litigation in general, it plays a special role in
connection with complex litigation. Rote case management may be-
come more common in mid-range cases, with tailored orders and fre-
quent supervision limited to large cases. Already, Rule 16(b) permits
districts to exempt small cases from case management,7 5 and various
experiments with "tracking" systems substitute form directives for
case control measures that take account of the individual characteris-
tics of the cases.76 The new discovery amendments exempt eight cate-
gories of simple cases from the required early conference of counsel to
develop a discovery plan.77 It seems obvious that judges are likely to
spend more time on the details of cases with higher stakes. The recent
imposition of numerical limitations on discovery may tend to accentu-
ate the focus of judicial control on large cases. Most cases, for in-
stance, do not involve more than ten depositions, so judicial
involvement to grant a dispensation from that limitation would be lim-
ited to larger ones.
E. Settlement Promotion
Beyond case management, promotion of settlement has become a
central procedural theme during the last quarter century. To some
extent, complex cases may have provided judges with their initial ex-
posure to this activity. In public law litigation, Professor Chayes sug-
gested that the judge's inability to design complicated remedial
regimes would incline her to urge the parties to agree on a remedy,
even if the question whether the defendant's conduct violated the law
74. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 § 102, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5090 (setting forth
findings by Congress that emphasized "techniques for litigation management and cost and delay
reduction" and invoked evidence that "suggests that an effective litigation management and cost
and delay reduction program" should incorporate certain features).
75. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (providing that the rule's case management requirements don't
apply to "categories of actions exempted by district court rule as inappropriate").
76. One reason for doing this may be to reduce the burden on judges. Professor Subrin
explains:
Case-by-case management developed because the transaction costs of procedural rules
with broad attorney latitude were too high. As a result of federal local rules and state
experimentation, the judiciary has already demonstrated that it thinks the transaction
costs of ad hoc case-by-case management are also too high. Judges are already turning
to formal limitations and definitions in order to reduce transaction costs.
Stephen Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and
Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2049 (1989).
77. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1)(E).
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was resolved by customary adjudication. 78 The judge who received
the Westinghouse uranium cases, for example, went so far as to invite
the lawyers to his house for cocktail parties before settlement meet-
ings to get them to relax and interact. 79 Mass tort cases, in turn, have
involved some of the most striking judicial settlement promotion.
More generally, however, it seems that settlement promotion has
taken hold at least as much for ordinary cases as complex ones.
Courts that hold "settlement days" or "settlement weeks" do not do
so for the relatively few major cases on their dockets. And the
proliferation of court-annexed settlement procedures shows that judi-
cial settlement promotion has increasingly been employed for most
cases, not just big ones. At the same time, it may be that complex
cases are the ones in which innovative judicial involvement may play
the greatest role. In mass tort litigation, for example, settlement dis-
cussions often involve demands by defendants for "global peace" that
cannot be accomplished without innovative judicial orders.80
F. Preclusion
Preclusion largely remains a preserve for case law development, but
it has evolved significantly over the last fifty years. The Restatement
(Second) of Judgments appeared in 1982, and it relaxed the tighter
traditional focus of claim preclusion (res judicata) and urged the use
of a transactional focus instead.8' Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has
largely abandoned the former mutuality requirement for issue preclu-
sion (collateral estoppel). 82
These developments might have been stimulated by, and had great
potential value, for megalitigation. Particularly in mass tort situations,
and to some extent in commercial litigation, a key problem is prolifer-
ation of suits raising the same issue. But it is not easy to conclude
that, in fact, the evolution of these principles was prompted by such
78. See Chayes, supra note 17, at 1298-99.
79. See Hubert L. Will, et al., The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203,
212-13 (1977) (offering description by Judge Robert Merhige of the cocktail party technique he
used to lubricate relationships among counsel in the case).
80. For example, in litigation alleging that birth defects resulted from use of Bendectin, the
district judge certified a mandatory class as a judicial accommodation to a settlement the lawyers
had reached because the defendant insisted on mandatory class certification before settling. See
MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 193 (1996). For an evaluation of this
effort, see Richard Marcus, Reexamining the Bendectin Litigation Story, 83 IOWA L. REv. 231,
238-42 (1997).
81. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDOMENTS (SECOND) § 24 (1982) (directing that claim preclusion
extend to the entire "transaction" involved in litigation).
82. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (granting trial courts broad discre-
tion to decide whether to allow offensive use of non-mutual collateral estoppel).
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cases. The Supreme Court's gradual abandonment of mutuality in-
volved cases falling somewhat within the bounds of complex commer-
cial litigation, but the expansion of res judicata hardly seems to have
been motivated by such litigation. To date, preclusion has neither
seemed to prompt nor to shape megalitigation, although the possibil-
ity of non-mutual offensive issue preclusion may have prompted de-
fendants toward more resolute defense of individual cases.83
G. Recapitulation
Certainly the foregoing are not the only procedural trends of the
last half century, 84 but they are together the most prominent. At a
general level, many procedural changes can be related to the growth
of complex litigation. Only one, the creation of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, directly resulted from megalitigation. Others,
such as judicial management, seem to have been stimulated initially by
such litigation, but not to be limited to it in full operation. So the
causal link between megalitigation and procedural innovation is gen-
erally moderate, although in a number of instances complex litigation
seems to have played a significant role in stimulating the develop-
ment. Turnabout being fair play, many of the procedural innovations
have played a role in creating complex litigation. As Professor Hen-
sler wrote in 1993, "there was an evolution of civil procedures which
ultimately facilitated mass tort litigation. ' 85 There seems, therefore,
to be a meaningful connection between complex litigation and proce-
dural change during the past fifty years.
IV. ASBESTOS LITIGATION: THE POSTER CHILD FOR PROCEDURAL
INNOVATION IN MEGALITIGATION
Assuming that megalitigation can be linked to procedural innova-
tion in the general way suggested above, it need not follow that any
one episode of megalitigation is likely to prompt such change all by
itself. Obviously, some specific instances of large-scale litigation do
so; the adoption of the multidistrict litigation statute in response to
83. But see Elinor D. Shroeder, Relitigation of Common Issues: The Failure of Nonparty Pre-
clusion and an Alternative Proposal, 70 IowA L. REV. 917 (1982) (suggesting that the relaxation
of mutuality did not prevent inappropriate relitigation, and proposing further measures includ-
ing expanded consolidation of cases).
84. Others that come to mind include the increased reliance of judges on sanctions partly
prompted by the 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the increased
reliance of judges on summary judgment to resolve cases.
85. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation:
A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1029 (1993).
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the experiment with the electrical equipment cases is the most obvious
example.
Some types of megalitigation stimulate innovation across a wide
range of procedures; of these, asbestos litigation is, perhaps, the best
example. To a large extent, this has resulted from invention born of
necessity. As Judge Becker put it fifteen years ago, asbestos cases
presented "the most serious crisis in the federal court system has faced
in its history." 86 By 1990, this crisis had prompted Chief Justice Rehn-
quist to appoint the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation to
study possible solutions. The committee recommended that Congress
devise a solution,87 but that has not happened. Courts have, there-
fore, continued trying to develop various procedural means to cope.
A survey of some of those efforts shows how pervasively asbestos has
affected procedural rules. Indeed, one could teach a fairly compre-
hensive course in complex litigation using materials from asbestos liti-
gation alone.
A. Joinder and Class Actions
Asbestos litigation is at the cutting edge of recent class action devel-
opments, despite the stated opposition of the framers of the 1966
amendments to mass tort class actions.88 But one could also say that
asbestos litigation represents the failure of class actions to deal with
the problems of this type of megalitigation.
The starting point is that common question class action treatment,
which was the innovative feature of the 1966 Rule 23 amendments,
seemed peculiarly inappropriate for asbestos litigation because such
cases regularly involve particularly challenging individual issues that
could not easily be resolved in the class action context. But some is-
sues, notably the viability of the "state of the art" defense, might suf-
fice to permit class certification. And Judge Robert Parker,
emphasizing the significance of those issues in individual asbestos tri-
als before him, certified a class action for all cases pending in his
court, which the Fifth Circuit upheld in 1986.89 This may have been
the high water point for successful mass tort class actions, and it bears
86. See Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefit of
Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 815, 815 (1992) (quoting
Judge Becker).
87. See Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation (1991)
(recommending that Congress consider a national legislative scheme to handle asbestos claims).
88. See supra note 37 (quoting 1966 Advisory Committee Note on mass tort class actions).
89. Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
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emphasis that the class action certification was limited to plaintiffs in
pending cases in only one district.
There remained the challenge of moving beyond aggregation of the
asbestos cases pending in a single court. What was needed was an-
other class action technique, and asbestos litigants attempted the ex-
treme use of two such techniques.
First, the settlement class action could potentially fill the bill. Law-
yers for the Center for Claims Resolution devised a path-breaking
strategy designed to provide a remedy for all people occupationally
exposed to asbestos and packaged this solution as a class action, argu-
ing that the class certification criteria should be applied in a relaxed
manner because of the settlement. The Third Circuit ruled that the
fact of settlement did not warrant relaxation of the certification re-
quirements 90 and a proposal to amend Rule 23 to add an explicit pro-
vision for settlement class actions soon followed. 91 In Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court rejected the Third Cir-
cuit's view that all certification factors apply with full force in the set-
tlement context, but also ruled that this particular settlement failed
due to differences in circumstance among class members. 92 The Court
recognized that although predominance of common questions could
be "readily met" in consumer, securities fraud, or antitrust class ac-
tions, it could not be readily met in mass tort cases.93 Moreover, al-
though the objections of the framers of the 1966 amendments to Rule
23 did not preclude mass tort class actions,94 their misgivings do call
for caution in certifying mass tort class actions. In addition, even if
there were predominant common questions, there must also be "struc-
tural assurances" of adequate representation as well.95 In the wake of
Amchem, common question settlement class actions might still be pos-
sible, but probably not for so sprawling a class as the one envisioned.
The second technique attempted was the limited fund "mandatory"
no opt-out class action, which emphasized the limited funds available
to pay judgments. Certainly many producers of asbestos products
confronted bankruptcy, and an arrangement accomplished through
the class action device might be superior to dismembering the compa-
nies through the bankruptcy process. That technique was tried in the
90. Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
91. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559 (1996) (proposing
addition of a new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(4) authorizing settlement classes).
92. 521 U.S. at 592 (1997).
93. Id. at 625.
94. See supra note 38 (quoting Court's treatment of 1966 Advisory Committee Note).
95. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627.
2001]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
mid-1980s in connection with some claims by property owners who
incurred costs for asbestos abatement. Although recognizing the ur-
gency of the problems of asbestos litigation, the Third Circuit held in
1986 that the limited fund theory could not be used, in part because
that suit did not even attempt to include all property claims, much less
personal injury claims as well.96
Efforts along this line nevertheless continued, and in 1999 the Su-
preme Court confronted a strong argument that there was a limited
fund in the Ortiz case, which involved an asbestos producer that had
relatively insignificant assets except for a dubious claim against two
insurers, which might be ruled invalid by the California courts.97 Both
sides faced financial disaster. The insurers might confront virtually
unlimited liability unless they succeeded in the California courts. The
asbestos company faced catastrophic liability due to asbestos litigation
if the insurers did prevail. Compromising to avoid the peril, they
agreed to a settlement limited fund mandatory class action creating a
billion dollar fund to pay claims by people injured by exposure to as-
bestos. The Supreme Court rejected this innovative use of Rule 23,
insisting that limited fund class actions be kept near what it found to
be the historical model, which did not allow such an adventurous use
of Rule 23.98
In sum, the asbestos litigation class action experience perfectly illus-
trates the role of procedural innovation in facilitating megalitigation
and the ability of megalitigation to prompt procedural innovation. At
the same time, it also illustrates the limitations on that innovation;
asbestos class actions have repeatedly been struck down for exceeding
the existing capacity for class action solutions to mass tort problems.
Perhaps those limits should prompt further amendments of Rule 23, a
possibility Chief Justice William Rehnquist mentioned in his brief con-
curring opinion in Ortiz.99 If such changes were forthcoming, it would
be clear that they responded in part to what the Chief Justice called
the "elephantine mass of asbestos cases,"'100 further showing that this
ongoing megalitigation has been the sparkplug of procedural change
in the area.
96. In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852
(1986).
97. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
98. Id. at 841-48. Of course, one could compare this fealty to the intentions of the 1966 fram-
ers to the indifference the Court displayed two years before to their explicit caution about mass
tort class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) (see supra notes 37 and 38), but
the Court's argument was that (b)(3) was intended to be adventurous, while (b)(1)(B) was not.
99. Id. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
100. Id.
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B. Multidistrict Transfer and Consolidation
Both multidistrict transfer and consolidation have risen to new im-
portance due to asbestos litigation.
Initially, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation declined in
1977 to transfer asbestos cases on the ground that they did not present
sufficient common questions. 1 1 In 1991, it changed its decision be-
cause the volume of asbestos litigation had risen to a magnitude that
"threaten[ed] the administration of justice and require[d] a new,
streamlined approach. ' 10 2 Thus, the Panel sought to use the transfer
power to the fullest to deal with the problems of megalitigation by
transferring over 26,000 asbestos personal injury cases to a single dis-
trict judge for combined treatment. In the process, it suggested a vari-
ety of cutting edge techniques for the transferee judge to consider,
including a single national class action trial or other types of consoli-
dated trials, limited fund class action determinations, and exploration
of global settlement. The Amchem settlement proposal grew directly
from negotiations after the transfer, 0 3 and questions about whether
cases so transferred should be returned continue to arise. The Panel's
action strained its statutory authority, which usually does not include
telling the transferee judge what to do with the cases, 10 4 and is strong
evidence of the pressure asbestos litigation has placed on this proce-
dural tool and the potential utility of the tool for resolving some
problems of megalitigation.
Consolidation for trial has also reached its apogee due to asbestos
litigation. The original purpose of consolidation was to avoid wasting
time when separate cases would entail holding essentially the same
trial twice. 10 5 But asbestos litigation prompted courts to push the pos-
sibilities of consolidation to its limits and presented the appellate
courts with questions about what those limits were. Perhaps the re-
cord was set by a state court in Baltimore that proceeded to "try"
more than 8,500 asbestos personal injury claims in one proceeding. 0 6
101. In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Products Liability Litig., 431 F. Supp.
906 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (refusing to transfer asbestos cases).
102. In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 418 (J.P.M.L.
1991).
103. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599 (reporting that "[a]fter the consolidation [pursuant to the
MDL Panel's order], attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants formed separate steering commit-
tees and began settlement negotiations").
104. The Panel only has authority to transfer. "The Panel does not review decisions of the
transferee court. Only the Court of Appeals for the transferee distrtict has that authority." Wei-
gel, supra note 50, at 578.
105. For background on consolidation, see Marcus, supra note 54, at 862-87.
106. See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821,
1839-40 (1995) (describing the dynamics of the Baltimore "common issues" trial).
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Again, Judge Robert Parker moved to a different level. He sought
to solve his problems in dealing with thousands of asbestos cases by
trying a sample of the cases and using the verdicts to provide an "aver-
age" recovery for those claimants whose cases were not tried.10 7
Judge Parker's innovative sampling effort received a good deal of
favorable academic press,'0 8 but the Fifth Circuit eventually held that
it was not permissible. 0 9
C. Discovery
Like much product liability litigation, asbestos cases show that
broad discovery is important to ensuring success for plaintiffs. Early
on, plaintiffs usually lost their cases, but by the mid 1970s, plaintiff
discovery had unearthed the evidence necessary to win on a regular
basis. As the Third Circuit recognized while bemoaning the growing
burden of asbestos litigation, "The procedures of the traditional tort
system proved effective in unearthing the hazards of asbestos to work-
ers and the failure of its producers to reduce the risk." 0 Undoubt-
edly, some who urged that broad discovery be curtailed were
prompted in part by asbestos litigation, but it does not seem distinc-
tive in that regard.
D. Judicial Case Management
When it upheld Judge Parker's certification of a common questions
class action for all the asbestos cases pending in his court, the Fifth
Circuit warned that:
The courts are now being forced to rethink the alternatives and pri-
orities by the current volume of litigation and more frequent mass
disasters. If Congress leaves us to our own devices, we may be
forced to abandon repetitive hearings and arguments for each
claimant's attorney to the extent enjoyed by the profession in the
past.'
107. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 151 F.3d 297
(5th Cir. 1998).
108. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 86, at 826-32, 839 (praising the method); Robert Bone,
Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 561, 571-74 (1993) (raising some questions about the method). For further development of
the sampling ideas that Judge Parker introduced, see Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sam-
pling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329 (1999); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Dam-
ages, 83 IowA L. REV. 545 (1998).
109. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the trial
method violated the right to jury trial and was based on improper assumptions).
110. In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1986).
111. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986).
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This attitude lies at the heart of the case management movement.
As the Fifth Circuit's warning suggests, asbestos cases provided a the-
ater for that sort of effort. Thus, the RAND study of asbestos litiga-
tion in the mid-1980s found that courts facing large asbestos caseloads
took an active role in managing the cases and developed specialized
routines for handling them.112
E. Settlement Promotion
Judicial promotion of settlement has sometimes played a very
prominent role in asbestos litigation. The Amchem settlement appar-
ently originated during sessions on asbestos litigation conducted at the
Federal Judicial Center.' 13 The Ortiz settlement was confected in part
with the assistance of Judge Patrick Higginbotham as special settle-
ment master, acting under designation by Judge Parker. 114
Besides these remarkable judicial roles in settlement promotion, as-
bestos litigation has more generally involved ordinary judicial settle-
ment promotion activities. And path-breaking settlement promotion
efforts for ordinary cases have emerged in asbestos litigation. One
effort was the creation of the Center for Claims Resolution, 115 which
may provide a model for large-scale resolution of claims in megalitiga-
tion. Indeed, defendants once urged that class certification should be
denied because the predecessor to the center offered a superior means
of responding to asbestos litigation." 6 Another was the practice of
"inventory" settlements by which some defendants pay lump sums to
settle all asbestos cases being pressed by a single lawyer or firm. 17
Reportedly, the problem with settling asbestos cases has been that
defendants lost patience with settlement as a way to reduce their
caseloads. From defendants' perspective, it seemed that the rate of
asbestos filings did not decrease even when they actively settled
112. See DEBORAH HENSLER, ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS 72-78 (1985) (describing
standardization and case management employed in asbestos litigation).
113. See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (reporting
that negotiations emerged in part from meetings at the Federal Judicial Center), rev'd, 83 F.3d
610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
114. See Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 167 F.R.D. 505, 515-16 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (describing role
of Judge Higginbotham).
115. See Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Center for Claims Resolution, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
13 (Autumn 1990) (describing the methods of the center).
116. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument
that the Wellington Facility, a precursor to the Center for Claims Resolution, was superior to a
class action in court as a method of resolving asbestos claims).
117. See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (describing
use of inventory or block settlements by group of asbestos defendants); HENSLER, ET AL., supra
note 112 (describing block settlements of asbestos cases).
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cases.' 18 Instead, the plaintiffs' lawyers found and filed other cases.
As a result, some other claimants supposedly refused to continue
making inventory settlements and to enter serious settlement discus-
sions only as individual cases were set for imminent trial.
F Preclusion
The prospect of using preclusion to simplify asbestos litigation un-
derstandably has been inviting, for one would think that some pro-
positions should be taken as established. The Ad Hoc Committee on
Asbestos Litigation, for example, entitled one section of its report
"Asbestos: Undeniably Dangerous." 19 Should defendants be pre-
cluded from denying the undeniable?
But defendants have won some asbestos suits. Although the effort
to use issue preclusion has been made by plaintiffs, it has not suc-
ceeded. The most notable example occurred when Judge Parker en-
tered an omnibus collateral estoppel order foreclosing re-litigation of
several points, including the point that "[p]roducts containing asbestos
are unreasonably dangerous.' 20 Because defendants had won many
of the cases that went to trial, under customary criteria for nonmutual
collateral estoppel the Fifth Circuit ruled that preclusion was not au-
thorized.12' Moreover, the court suggested that preclusion would be
proper only if "all juries presented with similar evidence regarding
asbestos products would be compelled to find those products unrea-
sonably dangerous,"' 22 seemingly parroting the standard for granting
a directed verdict. Thus, the promise of preclusion was not realized.
V. THE CONTRASTING ABSENCE OF PROCEDURAL INNOVATION IN
TOBACCO LITIGATION
The litany of procedural milestones from asbestos litigation con-
trasts starkly with to the absence of any similar impact from tobacco
litigation. Maybe this shows that this observer knows too little about
tobacco litigation; the remainder of this conference should begin to
solve that problem. Maybe this is because tobacco litigation is still in
its infancy, so that its procedural impact is yet to come. But if that is
118. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 294 (reporting that group of asbestos defendants decided to
stop pursuing inventory settlements "after finding that the settlement strategy was not diminish-
ing the number of pending claims").
119. See Report of Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, supra
note 87, at 4 (Part II of report entitled "Asbestos: Undeniably Dangerous").
120. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1982).
121. Id. at 346.
122. Id.
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so, it seems odd that we are already gathered here to assess things in
the wake of the tobacco wars, and this is hardly the first symposium
about tobacco litigation.
It is important to recognize that the there is a significant subjective
element to the conclusion that tobacco litigation has failed to produce
important procedural innovation. Undoubtedly, tobacco litigation has
produced decisions that press the limits of a number of topics that
could reasonably be characterized as procedural. Not surprisingly,
discovery disputes have cropped up on a variety of issues, particularly
including the application of the attorney-client privilege and the im-
plementation of protective orders that recur in other complex litiga-
tion. Joinder problems have plagued some tobacco cases. 123
Multidistrict procedures have been employed on occasion. And other
examples could be added. In general, however, these decisions have
not seemed to be milestones in the procedural hierarchy in the same
way as those in asbestos litigation and other megacases.
Perhaps this is best illustrated by the procedural decision in tobacco
litigation that is probably best known, the Castano class action. a24
That case surely had some potential for breakthrough. The district
judge invoked Robert Frost's choice to take the "road certainly less
traveled, if ever taken at all,"1 25 and the Fifth Circuit suggested that it
"may be the largest class action ever attempted in federal court. ' 126
As we all know, the appellate court invalidated the district judge's
class certification on the ground that, as to this immature mass tort, a
nationwide class action could not be maintained. In the wake of this
case, efforts went ahead to certify state-wide classes with mixed suc-
cess. Castano surely belongs "in the books"' 27 and is some evidence
of the impact of tobacco litigation on procedure.
But the impact of Castano is quite limited. Actually, plaintiffs in
Castano sought to follow the lead of the successful earlier effort to
obtain certification of an asbestos personal injury class, and the appel-
late court, therefore, explained why the certified asbestos case did not
justify class certification in Castano.128 To the contrary, the correct
reasoning flowed from another asbestos class action, the Third Cir-
123. See, e.g., Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 547 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (holding that
three smokers could not join, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, in their suit for damages due to smoking).
124. Castano v. The American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
125. Id. at 737.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., RICHARD MARCUS & EDWARD SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 323 (3d ed.
1998) (including Castano, 84 F.3d 734, as a principal case)..
128. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 743-745 n.18 (distinguishing Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782
F.2d 468 (1986) discussed in text accompanying supra note 89).
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cuit's decision in Amchem.129 So asbestos led the way, and tobacco
merely followed. Moreover, a central problem for class certification
in Castano was not really procedural. The claim asserted relied on
cutting edge tort law, and, thus, stood in stark contrast to the claims in
asbestos litigation, which had been litigated for years before plaintiffs
attempted to batch them in class proceedings. 130
On balance then, the biggest procedural case in the tobacco firma-
ment is more a boomlet than a boom. If megalitigation is a major
stimulant for procedural innovation, that is a surprise. The following
are some possible explanations.
A. Megalitigation Does Not Prompt Procedural Innovation
As the weakness of the conclusion that megalitigation leads to pro-
cedural innovation suggests, the entire idea may be wrong. It is weak,
at least, because the definition is so uncertain. No one has yet defined
the term "complex litigation," and many who criticize the tendency of
procedural rule makers to focus on this sort of cases are talking about
litigation of much smaller magnitude than tobacco litigation. So the
absence of procedural impact makes sense.
This skepticism is rebuttable. As has been shown for decades, there
have been efforts to refine procedures in order to address the difficul-
ties that result from specific types of megalitigation. And at least
some procedural innovations appear directly related to the genesis of
large scale litigation. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is
only the most obvious example. Had the plaintiffs succeeded in pre-
serving class certification in Castano, for example, the availability of
the class device itself would have been a generating factor behind liti-
gation of almost unimaginable dimensions. 13' Similarly, any state-
wide class actions that succeed will rely considerably on that device.
And asbestos shows that litigation of that dimension often has pro-
duced momentum for further procedural innovation.
So the absence of prominent procedural innovations for tobacco lit-
igation does not significantly undermine the general conclusion that
megalitigation has exerted a magnetic effect on procedural change.
129. See id. at 742-43 n.15 (citing Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.
1996)).
130. See id. at 746-47 (discussing the "immature tort" raised in the tobacco class action and
holding that, "a mass tort cannot be properly certified without a prior track record of trials from
which the district court can draw the information necessary to make the predominance and supe-
riority analysis").
131. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing case as "the largest class action
ever attempted in federal court").
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B. Mass Tort Megalitigation Affects Procedure
Only If Plaintiffs Win
Defining megalitigation is a risky undertaking, but it seems agreed
that suits by individual smokers would not qualify under most mea-
sures. There have been at least two waves of that sort of tobacco liti-
gation over the last forty years, but few or no academic conferences
about it until recently. The likely reason is that plaintiffs did not win
any cases. Among the various types of mass tort megalitigation, to-
bacco seems unique because no plaintiff received a penny for decades.
Mass tort megalitigation usually occurs only after an initial group of
plaintiffs succeed, either in court or at the bargaining table. Asbestos
again provides the comparison; even plaintiffs who were unsuccessful
in early asbestos litigation efforts were likely to manage a settlement
with some defendants. In 1973, plaintiffs won a breakthrough vic-
tory,132 prompting more suits. Yet four years later, the number of
those suits did not impress the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion when it was asked to transfer them for consolidated
proceedings. 33
Only gradually did the asbestos traffic jam develop. During that
time, other judges focused on similar concerns in other cases. In 1981,
for example, Judge Williams explained his certification of a Dalkon
Shield class action in part by referring to the number of Dalkon Shield
cases then on file and pointing out that if they all went to trial and
took as long as the one he had just tried, they would immobilize the
federal judiciary. 134 With the bankruptcy filing of Manville in 1982,
the true prospective dimensions of asbestos litigation began to dawn
on many. By the beginning of the 1990s, things had become suffi-
ciently pressing to prompt Chief Justice Rehnquist to appoint a special
committee to study the problem. That committee recommended ac-
tion by Congress. In 1991, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion reversed position to favor consolidating all the federal asbestos
cases. 135
The reason this judicial "crisis" developed was that asbestos litiga-
tion was a successful venture for plaintiffs, and thus for plaintiffs' law-
132. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974). Borel has been called "the bellwether asbestos case." THOMAS WILLGING,
ASBESTOS CASE MANAGEMENT: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES 9 (1985).
133. See In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Prod. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906
(J.P.M.L. 1977) (declining transfer).
134. See In re N. Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 893 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
135. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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yers. According to some defendants, that success prompted lawyers
to locate new plaintiffs to replace former ones when cases settled, and
they therefore stopped making inventory settlements with such law-
yers. Similarly in Dalkon Shield litigation, lawyers' interest in filing
new cases depended on the results of earlier cases. Not much plaintiff
success is required to prompt major bursts of litigation, however. In
the Bendectin litigation, for example, a single short-lived plaintiff vic-
tory sparked large-scale litigation before it was reversed on appeal.1 36
For years, there was no plaintiff success in tobacco litigation. With-
out endorsing the tobacco industry's scorched earth defense policy,
one must concede that lawyers were not trying hard to locate more
potential plaintiffs, as asbestos lawyers were supposedly doing. To the
contrary, they were shying away from tobacco litigation because the
returns, even though potentially high, were outweighed by the amaz-
ing cost of litigating against these adversaries. Without plaintiff victo-
ries, there would be no mass tort megalitigation; and without mass tort
megalitigation, there would be no stimulus toward procedural innova-
tion. As the Fifth Circuit emphasized in Castano, there was no "judi-
cial crisis" in tobacco litigation that would warrant using the class
action device. 137
Arguably, mass tort megalitigation did not ensue precisely because
the tobacco companies foresaw that possibility and effectively pre-
empted it.138 It appears that the potential impact of asbestos litigation
was not similarly apparent to asbestos companies for years. At the
time Manville filed its Chapter 11 petition, newspaper reports indi-
cated that the company had only recently forecast its potential expo-
sure. 139 It is evident that the tobacco companies saw the handwriting
136. See Green, supra note 80, at 159-66 (describing how an early plaintiff victory sparked
interest in Bendectin litigation and led to the filing of many more cases even though the judg-
ment was reversed and remanded for a retrial in which defendants prevailed).
137. Castano, 84 F.3d at 748.
138. See Robert Rabin, A Sociological History of Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV.
853, 856-58 (1992) (describing the tobacco industry's tactics of defending every claim, no matter
what the cost, as "unique in the annals of tort litigation," and explaining that this intransigence
was stimulated by the stakes involved).
139. Thus, initial reports on the Chapter 11 filing emphasized that it was a surprise given the
seeming economic health of the company. See, e.g., Merrill Brown & David Hoffman, Conglom-
erate Facing Asbestos Liability Files for Bankruptcy, WASH. Posr, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al (report-
ing that "[t]he Manville action today shocked Wall Street analysts and other industry
observers"). The company's explanation was that a study it had commissioned forecast a large
number of additional asbestos personal injury filings, and that accounting rules required that it
create a reserve account for this newly-identified litigation exposure that would trigger a default
in its outstanding loans. See id.; Tamar Lewin, Manville Bankruptcy Challenged, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 17, 1983, at D4, col. 4 (reporting that the required creation of a reserve left the company
"no choice but to file for bankruptcy"); Tamar Lewin, Manville Ready to File Its Reorganization
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on the wall from the outset. And it is also easy to comprehend the
potential impact on the courts had the early litigation results en-
couraged more suits. Consider the hypothetical suggested by Profes-
sor Weber: "What if the representatives of each of the 400,000
Americans that tobacco kills each year were to sue individually?"
1 40
Had that happened, the inventiveness of courts attempting to solve
the tobacco litigation problem through procedural means might have
made innovation in asbestos litigation look insignificant.
C. The Innovations Had Already Occurred or Been Rejected
Arguably, even a huge outburst of tobacco litigation would not have
caused much more procedural innovation. By the time the second
wave of tobacco litigation had begun,1 41 mass tort megalitigation more
generally had been around for some time. There must be a limit to
the kinds of procedural solutions for any type of megalitigation, and
hence, to the procedural innovations that could be used in mass tort
megalitigation. Perhaps tobacco did not prompt more innovation be-
cause none more was needed. As is sung in the musical Oklahoma,
"They've gone about as fur as they can go!" 142
Furthermore, the innovators in asbestos litigation had ultimately
been unsuccessful at least as often as they had succeeded with their
new procedures; the history of that litigation is littered with the
corpses of innovations accepted by district courts that were scotched
by the appellate courts. The Supreme Court invalidated two settle-
ment class actions, and the Fifth Circuit rebuffed Judge Parker's ef-
forts to broaden issue preclusion or rely on trials of a sample of cases
to establish values for others. Already in 1991, the Ad Hoc committee
on Asbestos Litigation, therefore, had concluded that "[n]o adequate
procedures exist to enable the justice system to deal with the unique
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1983, at D1 col. 1 (reporting that the company had profits from its
continuing operations, but that "the burden of current and future asbestos-related lawsuits even-
tually could drive it out of business"). Plaintiff lawyers, meanwhile, denied that there was a risk
of true insolvency, and denounced the company for filing the Chapter 11 petition because the
automatic stay in bankruptcy effected by the bankruptcy petition prevented pursuit of claims
against Manville. See Lawyers Plan Strategy Against Manville, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1982, at D3,
col. 1 (reporting that plaintiff attorneys would seek dismissal of the Manville bankruptcy filing as
"fraudulent").
140. Mark Weber, Thanks for Not Suing: The Prospects for State Court Class Action Litigation
Over Tobacco Injuries, 33 GA. L. REV. 979, 1010 (1999).
141. See Rabin, supra note 138, at 865 (applying the term "second wave" to this stage of
tobacco litigation).
142. Richard Rogers and Oscar Hammerstein II, Kansas City, in OKLAHOMA! (St. James The-
ater on Broadway, Mar. 31, 1943).
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nature of asbestos cases."' 143 By the time the tobacco litigation heated
up in the late 1990s, the lawyers likely knew what could and could not
be done with procedure.
The fact that at least some of the primary tobacco litigators on the
plaintiffs' side got their start in asbestos litigation supports this expla-
nation. 144 One would expect them to use the techniques that they al-
ready knew about. In Castano, for instance, they seemingly tried, in
part, to follow the path laid out a decade before by an asbestos class
action. More generally, it seems that the tools were in place for simi-
lar litigation efforts, perhaps even on the scale that could erupt if to-
bacco litigation reached its true potential.
But there are also reasons to believe that more procedural innova-
tion could be attempted. Most prominent is the appointment of the
Mass Torts Working Group by Chief Justice Rehnquist in early 1998
to study possible procedural changes that might require the involve-
ment of the federal rulemaking and legislation. And in 1999, it pro-
duced a report that attached a variety of measures that could go
further than any had formerly gone.145 So the "been there, done that"
explanation seems insufficient.
D. Procedural Innovation Has Been Less Important Than
Substantive Innovation in Tobacco Litigation
Maybe the problem with tobacco litigation has never been procedu-
ral but rather substantive. As Professor Rabin has noted, the final
version of § 402A of the Restatement of Torts "sounded the death
knell for the first wave of tobacco litigation."'' 46 Thereafter, smoking
regulation by some legal technique gained prominence across the
globe. 147 The second wave of tobacco litigation nevertheless foun-
dered repeatedly on the issue of plaintiff choice; even plaintiffs who
succeeded in proving defectiveness of the product might have a high
143. Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, supra
note 87, at 26.
144. Rabin, supra note 138, at 865 (pointing out that, asbestos litigation "serve[d] as the most
immediate link to the second wave of smoking cases," and the first big individual suit was han-
dled by attorneys who honed their skills in asbestos litigation).
145. See REPORT ON MASS TORTS LInGATION, supra note 29, at Appendix F (1999) (listing
fifteen separate proposals that had been offered for consideration).
146. Rabin, supra note 138, at 864.
147. See Robert Kagan and David Vogel, The Politics of Smoking Regulation: Canada, France,
the United States, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLrrIcS, AND CULTURE (Robert Rabin & Stephen
Sugarman eds., 1993) at 22, 24 (noting that every democratic industrialized country has acted to
restrict cigarette smoking).
[Vol. 51:457
REASSESSING THE MAGNETIC PULL
proportion of responsibility for their injuries assigned to them.1 48
That is one reason why plaintiffs did not win, and why no judicial crisis
and resulting procedural innovations followed.
What was needed was a new tort theory that sidestepped that prob-
lem, and reimbursement for providers of medical support offered
promise to do so. Those plaintiffs did not choose to smoke. Under
traditional tort doctrine, there are a lot of problems with this theory,
and it is not surprising that many courts have rejected versions of it.149
Moreover, some versions might introduce difficulties like the ones
that hamstrung class actions in mass tort litigation. But it clearly has
been the breakthrough of tobacco litigation in the current phase. And
second-hand smoke claims may be another.
Whether or not the reimbursement theory resulted from the bril-
liant insight of a single lawyer who sought to escape the difficulties
presented by the smoker choice 150 the basic point is that effective in-
novation in tobacco litigation has come in tort doctrine rather than
procedural technique. Surely one could imagine a legal regime in
which those who create public health risks that impose costs on public
health agencies would be required to pay for the resulting costs. One
who reflects on the role of state attorneys general in tcbacco litigation
is reminded that parens patriae was once proposed as a way to deal
with substantive problems in antitrust law.1 51 Surely there are argu-
ments against doing this, perhaps stronger in a system with tort law of
the sort that exists in the United States. But arguably, that this is a
more straightforward way of addressing the questions posed by this
public health problem than procedural innovations.
For some time there has been broad concern that procedural inno-
vation may stifle substantive rights or defenses. A criticism of 1938's
Big Bang, magnified by the adoption of the broader class action rule
148. See Rabin, supra note 138, at 870-73 (describing emphasis on freedom of choice as a
distinctive feature of the "second wave" of tobacco tort litigation).
149. See, e.g., Ass'n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dist. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 241 F.3d 696 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that public hospital districts may not sue for unreimbursed costs of treating smok-
ers, and noting that other courts of appeals have held that union trust funds lacked standing to
sue on similar grounds).
150. See DAN ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS 92 (2000) (saying that Mississippi lawyer Mike
Lewis was struck, after visiting a dying client in the hospital and reflecting on the high medical
costs connected with the client's illness, with the idea of having the state sue for medical costs it
had paid for that treatment, and that he relayed this idea to Mississippi Attorney General Mike
Moore, whom he had known as a law school classmate).
151. See The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2001)
(authorizing state attorneys general to sue for the "aggregate damages" sustained by citizens of
their states). For a critical discussion of the parens patriae legislative initiative, see Milton Han-
dler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in An Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 211, 248-56 (1975).
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in 1966, has been that the merits do not matter any more; when the
procedural innovations are wheeled into place on the litigation battle-
field, victory is determined without substantial reference to the merits
and hence, to the substance of the case. 52 Thus in 1970, Professor
Milton Handler objected that procedural innovation had supplanted
substantive innovation in antitrust litigation. 153 Antitrust litigation is
much less prominent nowadays, but Professor Handler's concern is
likely to be most prominent in megalitigation. That is the preserve of
the "bet your company" case, and tobacco litigation is the biggest such
case one can imagine.
Asbestos litigation provides an example of this concern. At least
one motivation for the innovative use of class actions in those cases
goes beyond solving a judicial crisis. Judges understandably were
chagrined at the unevenness of outcomes, and the risk that some in-
jured individuals would recover little or nothing while others received
large windfall punitive damages awards. The settlements in Amchem
and Ortiz could be characterized as efforts to replace the tort system
with a compensation scheme better suited to the needs of the in-
jured. 54 Thus, procedural innovation could alter substantive rights, a
point the Supreme Court mentioned in holding the class certifications
in those cases invalid.1 55
More generally, Professor Handler's 1970 conclusion about anti-
trust litigation might apply to much megalitigation during the ensuing
three decades. Often the cutting edge procedure loomed as more im-
portant than the cutting edge substantive rule. As Professor Hensler
noted in 1993, "Most proposals for change focus on procedure rather
than substantive doctrine."' 56 As some class actions suggested, the
152. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (suggesting that certified securities class actions all
settle for about the same proportion of losses, and that the actual merits of the claims must not
be important in setting that proportion since the merits must vary among cases). Compare Joel
Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 449-53 (1994) (questioning Alexander's
conclusions).
153. Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-
The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1 4-5 (1971) (explaining that the
"sheer magnitude" of cases had meant that "the procedures associated with massive litigation
have come to assume a growing importance to the antitrust practitioner").
154. See Richard Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 COR-
NE L L. REV. 858 (1995) (questioning the use of the class action device as a method for dealing
with perceived deficiencies in substantive tort law).
155. See Ortiz, 529 U.S. at 845 ("The Rules Enabling Act underscores the need for caution");
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 612-13.
156. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 85, at 1052.
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substantive rule might be modified to suit the procedure. 157 For ex-
ample, although medical monitoring could be an important individual
remedy, it might become much more important as a substantive
method to facilitate class action treatment.
Against this background, the source and focus of innovation in to-
bacco litigation may be refreshing because it is mainly substantive.
That reaction is confirmed by examination of symposia about tobacco
litigation that focus on tort law, not procedure. 158 Because the dimen-
sions of this new form of tort litigation make it megalitigation, the
techniques that have been developed for other megalitigation may
often need to be deployed. And maybe some new techniques would
also be helpful, for as we have seen the string of innovation has not
necessarily run out. But there is also a possibility that the future holds
more examples of major litigation that breed substantive innovation
rather than procedural breakthroughs.
VI. CONCLUSION
My starting point was the reaction that, unlike other mass tort
megalitigation, tobacco litigation had not produced many notable
changes in procedure. Because the litigation is widely touted as the
biggest in history, this result seems notable. Other megalitigation
surely spurred important procedural changes, and procedural changes
facilitated some of that litigation. Yet the connection between the big-
gest cases and the biggest procedural changes is not particularly
strong. Although asbestos litigation lumbered into a wide variety of
procedural rules due to its size, those dimensions were ultimately a
product of the rate of success for individual asbestos plaintiffs. To-
bacco plaintiffs never had much success until the states started filing
suits relying on a new substantive theory, not a new set of procedures.
And so I end on a tentative note that those who have deplored the
reign of procedure may find uplifting. Perhaps a corner has been
157. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 & n.24 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976) (defendants argued that proof of reliance precluded class certification, and the
court remarked that it could revise the standards for proof of reliance and thereby solve the
problem raised by defendants).
158. See, e.g., Symposium, Beyond Tobacco: Tort Issues in Light of the Cigarette Litigation, 27
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 685-768 (2000) (speculating on the impact of the new liability theories on
which tobacco litigation was based); Symposium, Torts and Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REV. 693-1020
(1999); Symposium, 22 So. ILL. U. L. J. 467-723 (1998).
By way of contrast, into the 1990s symposia about procedural innovation in complex litigation
make no mention of tobacco litigation. See, e.g., Symposium on Problems in Disposition of Mass
Related Cases and Proposals for Change, 10 REV. LITIG. 209-584 (1991) (mentioning many types
of litigation including asbestos, Agent Orange, DES and Dalkon Shield, but not tobacco
litigation).
2001]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
turned, and the proceduralists can be relegated to their proper role as
handmaidens to the substantive law. At least recent events in tobacco
litigation suggest that procedure plays a subservient role in its litiga-
tion breakthroughs. Other recent events, however, suggest that the
new tobacco tort paradigm may not be readily transferred to litigation
concerning other products.' 59 If future megalitigation reverts to past
form, we proceduralists can look forward to full employment in the
future. This one, at least, is not yet ready to switch to torts.
159. Thus, suits against gun makers have not enjoyed great success. See Harriet Chang,
Gunmakers No Easy Target, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 12, 2001, at A4 (reporting that the "tobacco
model isn't working for cities as [a] strategy for lawsuits." Id.).
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